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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a
federal regulatory agency granted authority under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to oversee and promote the
safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics manufactured or sold in the
† Suneel Arora, Timothy J. Christman, and Ashley N. Mays, PhD are with
the law firm of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. Andrew Schmidt is with
the firm Pauly DeVries Smith and Deffner, LLC. The views herein do not
necessarily represent those of the authors’ firms or the clients of those firms.
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1

United States. Under the FDCA, the FDA is also responsible for
approval or clearance of medical devices to be marketed or sold
2
within the United States. Navigating the FDA regulatory approval
process is a challenge faced by well-established medical device
manufacturers and startups alike. Generally, such organizations
either hire or routinely consult with experts in preparing
submissions related to product approval or clearance and in
developing and maintaining compliance with FDA-enforced
requirements. In parallel with these regulatory efforts, medical
device developers also routinely work vigorously to establish
intellectual property (IP) rights, such as patents.
Regulatory compliance is often treated as wholly independent
from development or enforcement of IP rights. Even sophisticated
organizations prepare and file regulatory submissions but fail to
consider the impact that those submissions may have on their IP
portfolio. For example, statements made in such regulatory
submissions may detrimentally impact patent validity or
enforceability.
Information related to clinical efficacy or
competitor devices may later be considered to have been material
to patentability. Delays associated with the regulatory approval
process may provide an opportunity to beneficially extend a
patent’s enforceable term. In this paper, we explore this interplay
between patent law and the FDA regulatory process.
II. CLEARANCE OR APPROVAL—510(K) NOTIFICATION VERSUS PMA
Under the FDCA and its implementing regulations, the FDA
3
considers medical devices to fall into one of three classifications.
Class I is reserved for devices requiring only “general controls” to
4
ensure safety and effectiveness. For example, a device that “(I) is
not purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health, and (II)
does not present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury”
5
would fall into class I.
Class II is reserved for devices presenting an intermediate level
of risk. According to the FDCA, such devices fall into class II
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2006).
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (“Classification of devices intended for human use”).
Id. § 360c(a)(1).
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
Id.
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because “general controls by themselves are insufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness,” and special
controls can be established “to provide such assurance, including
the promulgation of performance standards, postmarket
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of
guidelines (including guidelines for the submission of clinical data
6
in premarket notification submissions . . . ).”
Class III is reserved for devices posing the highest level of risk,
such as a device for use in supporting or sustaining human life or
for use in preventing impairment of human health, or a device
7
presenting a potentially unreasonable risk of illness or injury.
The FDA’s medical device classification scheme may seem
somewhat arbitrary, but a particular device’s classification can be
determinative with respect to the cost, timing, and certainty
surrounding FDA approval or clearance of the device. If a device
falls into class III and is not subject to an exemption for certain
older devices marketed prior to 1976, then the device must be
submitted to the FDA under the premarket approval (PMA)
8
process specified in FDCA section 515. In contrast, if a device falls
into class I or II, the device may be marketed and sold once the
device is “cleared” via the process specified in FDCA section
9
510(k).
PMA is far more cumbersome than the 510(k) clearance
process and can be both costly and time-consuming. The PMA
route generally involves the submission of a device description and
indications, marketing and manufacturing information, reference
to pertinent performance standards, preclinical investigatory
10
studies, and proposed labeling. For example, for PMA, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e requires “full reports of all information, published or known
to or which should reasonably be known to the applicant,
concerning investigations which have been made to show whether
11
or not such device is safe and effective.” The FDA may require
12
additional supplemental submissions as well.
Once all of the
relevant information is provided to the FDA, the process may still
take years.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
Id. §§ 360e(a)–(b), 360j(g).
Id. § 360.
See, e.g., id. § 360e(f) (“Product development protocol”).
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 360e(c)(1)(H).
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In comparison, the 510(k) clearance process, referred to as
“premarket notification,” is abbreviated and uses somewhat
different terminology. In the PMA process, the applicant “submits”
the device for approval, and the FDA “approves” the device. In the
510(k) process, the applicant “notifies” the FDA, and the FDA
“clears” the device for sale.
A 510(k) notification generally must be made at least ninety
13
days prior to launch; in comparison, the delay for PMA review by
the FDA should be no longer than 180 days, by statute, yet actual
14
delays are frequently longer. Under the 510(k) clearance process,
an applicant notifies the FDA of a new device and asserts
15
substantial equivalence to a predicate device. The applicant then,
hopefully, receives a letter from the FDA, finding the new device is
16
The applicant
substantially equivalent to the predicate device.
can then market and offer the device for sale in the United States.
III. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE TO A PREDICATE DEVICE UNDER
510(K) NOTIFICATION
When notifying the FDA of an applicant’s intent to market a
new device under the 510(k) process, the applicant identifies a
“predicate device,” that is, a legally marketed equivalent device, and
then must provide details showing that the new device is
17
“substantially equivalent” to the predicate device.
Such a
predicate device may be one of the applicant’s own devices or a
competitor’s device.
Additionally, the applicant must include a statement of
intended use, including a general description of “diseases or
conditions that the device will diagnose, treat, prevent, cure, or
mitigate, including a description, where appropriate, of the patient
18
population for which the device is intended.”
If these factors
differ between the new device and the identified predicate device,
an explanation is required as to why the differences do not affect

13. Id. § 360(k).
14. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(a). Further specific requirements are outlined in 21
C.F.R. § 807.81–.100 (2012).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 360(o).
16. See id. § 360(n) (requiring the FDA to make a determination of
substantial equivalence within ninety days).
17. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 for information regarding the content and format
of the 510(k) summary.
18. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(5).
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19

the safety and effectiveness of the new device. From the FDA’s
perspective, the touchstone of “substantial equivalence” is
demonstration of safety and efficacy via a showing that the
applicant’s new device is at least as safe and effective as an existing
20
marketed device.
According to the FDA, a device is substantially equivalent if, in
comparison to a predicate device, the new device either: (a) has the
same intended use as the predicate device and has the same
technological characteristics as the predicate device; or (b) the new
device has the same intended use as the predicate device and has
different technological characteristics, and the information
submitted to the FDA does not raise new questions of safety and
effectiveness and demonstrates that the device is at least as safe and
21
effective as the legally marketed device.
In the substantial equivalence determination, “technological
characteristics” can include such aspects as design, material
selection, chemical composition, or energy source, for example. If
the device has the same technological characteristics, a summary of
the technological characteristics of the new device in comparison
to those of the predicate device is included in the 510(k) summary
22
submitted by the applicant.
If the device has different
technological characteristics than the selected predicate device, the
summary must show how the technological characteristics of the
23
device compare to the legally marketed predicate device.
IV. PATENT LAW’S INTERSECTION WITH 510(K) NOTIFICATION
At least two aspects of patent law may intersect with a medical
device developer’s 510(k) strategy. First, the developer should
consider the impact of regulatory submissions on patentability, as
well as on the validity of any resulting patents. For example,
equivalence assertions made in the context of safety and efficacy
may indirectly implicate equivalence from a perspective of novelty
or obviousness under patent law. Secondly, the developer should
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. § 807.92(b).
Id. § 807.100(b); see also Premarket Notification (510k), U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(FDA),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice
/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.htm (last visited Jan.
16, 2013).
22. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(6).
23. Id.
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consider whether such submissions include factual averments that
may point the way for a competitor to allege infringement by the
applicant, or for a competitor to evade infringement using the
applicant’s own admissions.
V. PATENTABILITY
In order to obtain a patent in the United States, an invention
24
must be new, useful, and non-obvious. A patent application must
generally be filed with the cooperation of the inventor, and the
25
application must properly list all of the inventors. The usefulness
or “utility” requirement is a relatively low bar to meet; presumably,
most medical devices would satisfy this requirement, leaving novelty
and non-obviousness to be shown.
Regarding novelty, the portions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 pertinent to
patent applications filed before March 16, 2013 include a “statutory
26
bar” to filing in certain circumstances. Under § 102(b), a person
shall be entitled to a patent unless “the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . .
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent
27
in the United States.”
The novelty requirement ensures that
patents are only issued for new inventions. An invention lacks
novelty if anticipated, or described, by a previously published
28
reference, termed “prior art.” According to the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) section 2131, “[a] claim is anticipated
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (Supp. V 2011).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 115. Sweeping reforms to patent law were recently enacted
by Congress in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284, 284–341 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390). For
applications including an effective filing date after September 16, 2012, it is now
possible for an assignee or other applicant having a “proprietary interest” in the
patent application to proceed without the cooperation of the inventors, though
under this procedure “sufficient” notice must still be provided to the inventors
before the patent is granted to a real party in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 118.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (pre-AIA). The passage of the AIA has
substantially altered § 102 as applied to patents having an effective filing date after
March 16, 2013. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3. Among other changes, the
AIA’s amendment of § 102 broadens the scope of what activities constitute public
disclosure, and places less restriction on where such activities must take place in
order to be considered prior art. Id. However, the considerations discussed in
relation to 510(k) notification in view of § 102 prior to amendment are believed
generally applicable to § 102 as amended by the AIA. See generally 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2011).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (pre-AIA).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 2011).
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only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found,
either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
reference” and that “identical invention must be shown in as
29
complete detail as is contained in the . . . claim.”
Under § 102(b), a prospective patent applicant who has also
submitted a 510(k) summary may have a grace period of up to one
year to file a utility patent application concerning the subject
matter of the 510(k) summary from the date of public access to the
substance of the 510(k) notification. This assumes no other public
disclosure, offers for sale, or other events that themselves may start
the clock ticking. For example, lack of FDA clearance does not
30
protect the prospective patent applicant from the on-sale bar. For
prospective patent applicants considering a global patent strategy,
not all jurisdictions offer a grace period, so publication of the
510(k) summary before any patents have been filed can destroy
31
foreign patent filing rights.
Accordingly, the prospective patent applicant should file any
patent applications related to the 510(k) submission well in
advance of the submission, or at least in advance of the publication
of the submission. Presently, decisions and 510(k) summaries are
published on the FDA website by the fifth of the month following
clearance, and further supporting information is available via a
32
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
Novelty and statutory bars are not the only concerns. A patent
must also be non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 recites that a patent may
not be obtained “if the differences between the subject matter
29. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2131 (8th ed., rev. 8, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter
MPEP] (quoting Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989)),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
30. The “on-sale bar” prevents the patenting of an invention that has been
on sale for more than one year. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (pre-AIA). However,
“FDA approval is not required before a sale can bar patent rights.” CR Bard, Inc.
v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
31. This does not imply that applicants must file in all jurisdictions of interest
prior to public availability of a 510(k) notification. The prospective patent
applicant should consider whether a priority filing in a country that is a signatory
of the Paris Convention or other international agreement may be sufficient to
establish rights, in advance of publication of the 510(k) submission. For example,
a provisional patent filing in the United States may be sufficient to preserve rights
in many—but not all—jurisdictions.
32. The website for 510(k) notifications at the FDA can be found at:
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm#main.
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sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
33
which said subject matter pertains.”
Unlike “anticipation” under § 102, obviousness is a nebulous
and somewhat subjective inquiry. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City established that an obviousness determination requires a series
of factual inquiries, including determining:
1. the scope and the content of the prior art;
2. the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art; and
34
3. the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
The Graham inquiries underpin a legal determination of
obviousness and were recently revisited and reaffirmed in KSR
35
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
Unlike anticipation, in which a
single reference must show each and every limitation in an
applicant’s patent claims, obviousness involves finding the pieces of
36
the puzzle in various references.
Often, all that is lacking is a motivation to combine the various
references and a teaching of how such a combination might be
made. An applicant’s own 510(k) notification materials might
inadvertently provide such a motivation or may provide evidence of
expectation of success. To avoid these issues, an applicant might
be tempted to disclose only what is necessary to demonstrate
equivalence from a safety and efficacy perspective. But the
37
applicant has an obligation of candor to the FDA. The applicant
may be faced with dilemmas involving whether to omit patentable
features from the FDA materials or to construct arguments as to

33. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (pre-AIA). As amended by the AIA, § 103
remains similar in spirit to the pre-AIA statute. The primary difference is the
replacement of the phrase “obvious at the time the invention was made” with the
phrase “obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,”
illustrating the shift in emphasis from date of invention in the old law to the
concept of the “effective” filing date under the new law, thereby further
incentivizing prospective patent applicants to file as early as possible. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (Supp. V 2011). The new § 103 applies to patent applications having an
effective filing date after March 16, 2013. Id.
34. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
35. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
36. See id. at 418–419.
37. 21 C.F.R. § 807.93 (2012). Such an obligation to the FDA is independent
of the applicant’s “duty to disclose information material to patentability” to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
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why particular features can be omitted because they are believed
not to relate to safety or efficacy.
Again, the best approach is to file any patents before
submitting the 510(k) summary. The 510(k) summary can then be
constructed to avoid overbroad statements of equivalence that
extend beyond safety and efficacy. For example, one wearing a
regulatory hat may be tempted to use phrases such as “identical”
for persuasive weight. Such assertions may impact novelty or non38
obviousness if construed broadly and out of context.
Prospective patentees may find themselves in a position where
their 510(k) asserts that a device is substantially equivalent to a
family of different predicate devices, and such predicate devices
may include all of the patentee’s claim elements in combination.
39
Remember that the applicant only needs one predicate device. In
fact, claiming substantial equivalence to multiple predicate devices
may create unnecessary IP risks without obtaining any concomitant
regulatory benefit. Accordingly, it is important to choose the
predicate device(s) carefully, with patentability and infringement
in mind, as well as “substantial equivalence” considerations. Case
law shows that the requisite statement of substantial equivalence in
terms of safety and efficacy is less likely to affect patentability or
infringement than the accompanying factual summary of
technological characteristics, which can hurt or help.
40
In Sunrise Medical HHG, Inc. v. AirSep Corp., Sunrise sued
AirSep for patent infringement. AirSep challenged validity based
on Sunrise’s 510(k) assertion of substantial equivalence between
41
Sunrise’s patented EX 2000 device and the prior art. Specifically,
the Sunrise 510(k) notification stated:
The PulseDose series devices are fundamentally repackaged
versions of the OMS 20 and 50, DeVilbiss current oxygen
management system. There are no significant changes in
the materials or features. Therefore, based on the abovementioned similarities, especially the dosage methodology, the
PulseDose Series devices and the OMS 20 and 50 are
38. An applicant might also consider including a disclaimer in their 510(k)
summary defining “substantial equivalence” in accordance with the FDCA and
disclaiming definition according to the patent statute (e.g., “this document uses
the term ‘substantial equivalence’ as defined in 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 and not as
considered in 35 U.S.C. § 112”).
39. 27 C.F.R. § 807.92; see supra text accompanying notes 17–22.
40. 95 F. Supp. 2d 348 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
41. Id. at 405–06.
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substantially equivalent devices. . . . The gas dose
methodology oxygen delivery specifications and
performance of the device in the PulseDose series are
identical to those of the OMS 20 and 50. . . . Previous
designs of the DeVilbiss OMS 50 and 20 had similar
components except for the integral regulator and
42
pressure relief.
The Sunrise court disregarded the 510(k) notification, stating that
its sole purpose was to demonstrate to the FDA that the EX 2000
43
was as safe and effective as the predicate device. The substantial
equivalence assertion focused on the gas dose methodology, which
was not the subject matter of the patent claim, and other patented
differences were omitted from the 510(k) notification because they
44
were not essential to safety and effectiveness.
Sunrise shows the importance of carefully wording a substantial
equivalence assertion to limit its scope to safety and efficacy. But
the accompanying factual assertions can help or hurt patentability
or infringement, depending on whether the assertions are focused
toward or away from the patent claims. Here, it helped, because
the factual assertions focused the basis of the FDA substantial
equivalence away from the subject matter of the patent claims.
VI. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND THE LINGERING
510(K) NOTIFICATION
The 510(k) notification can remain a latent issue long after
FDA clearance and the grant of a patent. For example, the 510(k)
notification may be factually relevant to a variety of infringement
45
situations including direct or indirect (e.g., induced
or
46
47
contributory ) infringement. The 510(k) notification may also
implicate infringement under the doctrine of equivalents or willful
48
infringement.
The test for infringement of a patent claim is determined on
an element-by-element basis. Direct infringement requires literal
identity between the claims and an infringer’s device and is in some
42. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting plaintiff’s exhibits 154 and 155) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 406.
44. Id. at 405.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
46. Id. § 271(c).
47. See id. § 271.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 66–67.
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ways a mirror image of determining anticipation.
For direct
infringement, every claimed element in the patent must be found
50
in the accused infringer’s device. In addition to a theory of direct
51
infringement, a theory of indirect infringement also exists.
Indirect infringement can have two forms: contributory
infringement or induced infringement. Contributory infringement
involves a defendant providing a component, a material, or an
52
apparatus for the purpose of infringement. In contrast, induced
infringement involves the defendant inducing another party to
53
infringe.
Similar to patentability, substantial equivalence, by itself, does
not admit patent infringement because substantial equivalence and
patent infringement are fundamentally different inquiries. For
substantial equivalence, a comparison of a product to a predicate
54
device is performed.
For patent infringement an element-byelement comparison of the patent’s claims to the accused product
55
is performed.
Courts have been wary of the risk of confusing the jury with
the 510(k) substantial equivalence assertion to the FDA. In
Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems
GMBH, the court called counsel’s statement to the jury that
BrainLAB had admitted equivalence in its FDA submission an
56
abuse of advocacy. Additionally, in Cardiovention, Inc. v. Medtronic,
Inc., the court stated that admitting 510(k) evidence would be
57
misleading and unfairly prejudicial to Medtronic.
There have
been many cases that note these problems and make somewhat
sweeping statements regarding the admissibility of FDA submission
data.
However, it is best to be wary of statements in the case law
implying that 510(k) notifications are somehow generally
inadmissible in infringement proceedings. Supporting statements
to the FDA may still be used to help establish or defeat

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
2008).
56.
57.

35 U.S.C. § 271; see also supra text accompanying notes 27–29.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 27–29.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c).
Id. at § 271(c).
Id. at § 271(b).
21 U.S.C. § 360(o)(1).
See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir.
417 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1201 (D. Colo. 2006).
483 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 (D. Minn. 2007).
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infringement. “Technological characteristics” and other specific
information in the FDA submission may be used to develop a
patent infringement case. For example, in U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Hospital Products International Pty. Ltd., the court noted that, beyond
a generalized “substantial equivalence” assertion, the defendant
also stated that “[b]oth devices utilize the same type of disposable
cartridges . . . [which] utilize similar staples, similar anvils, similar
58
staple line configurations, and the same tissue-joining methods.”
Such a series of statements can provide a road map that the
patentee can use to establish factual predicates in support of a
patent infringement claim.
Also, in Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.,
the court held as admissible statements
made by Abbott in its letters to the FDA and [USPTO]
regarding whether Baxter’s proposed product as
described in its [Abbreviated New Drug Application]
contain[ed] an effective amount of Lewis acid inhibitor
and statements made in those letters indicating that a
water content of 300 ppm is required to effectively
59
prevent degradation regardless of the container.
Again, factual statements made to the FDA are not immune from
being used against an accused infringer and are often used for that
very purpose.
All is not lost, however. “Technological characteristics” and
other specific information in the FDA submission may also be used
to refute an infringement case. In University of Florida v. Orthovita,
Inc., the court considered a technical chart that was in the 510(k)
60
The chart noted marked differences between the
notification.
cleared product and the predicate device with regard to patented
61
particle size. Thus, because the contents of an FDA submission
can be used to hurt or help a patent infringement defense, it may
be helpful to keep such potential considerations in mind when
preparing the FDA submission.

58. 701 F. Supp. 314, 347 (D. Conn. 1988) (alteration in original).
59. No. 01-C-1867, 2004 WL 2496459, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2004). An
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) submission for a pharmaceutical is
somewhat analogous to a 510(k) notification for a medical device, providing an
abbreviated pathway to marketability of a drug based upon a scientific showing of
“bioequivalence” to an “innovator” drug in the same sort of way that “substantial
equivalence” must be shown to a predicate device in the medical device context.
60. No. 1:96-CV-82-MMP, 1998 WL 34007129 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2008).
61. Id. at *23 n.23.
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Other issues related to patent infringement can be raised by
the 510(k) notification. For example, the 510(k) notification can
provide statements to support (or refute) a doctrine of equivalents
62
analysis, such as by establishing similarity of “function/way/result”
63
or “insubstantial differences,” two common tests used for
determining patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., the
court acknowledged that a bioequivalency statement to the FDA, by
itself, does not constitute an admission of patent infringement, but
noted that it may be relevant to the “function” prong of the
“function-way-result” test for infringement under the doctrine of
64
equivalents.
In Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., the court questioned the
relevance of the actual 510(k) filing, because it is controlled by a
65
different regulatory scheme. However, the Mahurkar court then
went on to note that Bard’s 510(k) filing showed that Bard did not
retest the accused infringing Hickman II catheter and then used
that fact as probative of functional equivalence in determining
66
patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In sum,
factual and other statements in a 510(k) filing, other than the mere
assertion of “substantial equivalence,” can create latent issues that
can spring to light many years later during a patent infringement
lawsuit.
Willful patent infringement can also potentially be implicated
by a 510(k) filing. Willful infringement, which can lead to up to
tripled damages and an award of attorney’s fees, is determined
67
using a “totality of circumstances” test. One might imagine that a
62. This test asks whether the allegedly infringing device performs
substantially the same function, substantially the same way, to perform
substantially the same result as the limitations recited in the patent claim. See
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
63. This test asks whether “[a]n element in the accused device is equivalent
to a claim limitation if the only differences between the two are insubstantial.”
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
64. 566 F.3d 1282, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
65. No. 92-C-4803, 1993 WL 259446 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1993).
66. Id. at *9. Infringement can be found under the doctrine of equivalents
when a device falls outside the literal scope of a claim, but the differences are
insubstantial. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997).
67. Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove “by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 5

2013]

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FDA AND PATENT LAW

1189

510(k) filing could be viewed as an admission used to establish
knowledge of the predicate device, which may be patented. It may
be worth considering whether such a “circumstance” can be used in
the “totality of circumstances” test for willful infringement to
establish knowledge of the patent rights associated with the
predicate device.
Other illustrative holdings help further explain the
relationship between FDA submissions and patent infringement.
In American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Laser Peripherals, LLC, the court
found that material issues of fact remained on a summary
judgment motion regarding patent infringement because “a
reasonable jury could find that the accused devices do not meet the
[claim] limitations regardless of [the defendant’s] representations
68
to the FDA.” In Cardiovention, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., the court
found that an admission of substantial equivalence in a 510(k)
notification does not, by itself, constitute an admission of patent
infringement because substantial equivalence has a different
69
meaning in the FDA context than in the patent context.
VII. CANDOR TO BOTH THE FDA AND THE USPTO
There is an obligation to disclose any information “material to
patentability” to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
70
(PTO) during the patent application process. Failure to comply
with this obligation can result in a finding of unenforceability of a
patent or even unenforceability of an entire patent family (e.g., a
parent patent, to which priority is claimed, and divisional or
continuation patents, which claim priority from the patent raising
the unenforceability issue). Such an “inequitable conduct” defense
is often raised during patent litigation, and can implicate inventors
and patent counsel alike.
As an initial note, patent attorneys and others involved in the
patent process sometimes assume that they are obligated only to
provide material “prior art,” such as prior patents or academic
papers predating the patent applicant’s filing date. However, it is
important to recognize that patents and other prior art are not the
only forms of information material to patentability. It is not
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), .
68. 712 F. Supp. 2d 885, 905 (D. Minn. 2010).
69. 483 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 (D. Minn. 2007).
70. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
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inconceivable that such material information may potentially
include, for example, regulatory submissions, clinical data (either
positive or adverse), or adverse event reports.
There are two elements of inequitable conduct: materiality
and intent. Regarding materiality, the Federal Circuit recently
ruled that, “as a general matter, the materiality required to
establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an
applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is butfor material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been
71
aware of the undisclosed prior art.”
Regarding intent, prior court rulings demonstrate that
“[i]ntent need not be proven by direct evidence; it is most often
proven by a showing of acts, the natural consequence of which are
72
presumably intended by the actor.”
There had been a recent
trend that high materiality may weigh heavily in favor of an
73
inference of intent. However, in Therasense. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., the Federal Circuit unequivocally stated that “[i]ntent to
mislead and materiality must be separately proved. There is no
‘sliding scale’ under which the degree of intent that must be
proved depends on the strength of the showing as to the materiality
74
of the information at issue.”
Failure to disclose a particular piece of information does not
obviate the need to prove specific intent by clear and convincing
evidence. For example, intent to deceive cannot be “inferred solely
from the fact that information was not disclosed; there must be a
75
factual basis for a finding of deceptive intent.” Proof that nondisclosed information was highly material and that the patent
applicant knew or should have known of that materiality makes it
“difficult to show good faith to overcome an inference of intent to
76
mislead.”

71. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
72. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73. See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“Given the highly material nature of these misleading statements and
the failure to submit a directly conflicting article co-authored by the declarant
himself, the district court did not clearly err in inferring an intent to deceive.”
(citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d at 1180)).
74. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1304.
75. Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
76. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Similar to the obligation of candor to the PTO, there is also an
obligation not to engage in puffery or mislead the FDA. Applicants
must be honest in relation to their disclosures to the FDA,
including any substantial equivalence assertion made in a 510(k)
filing. In fact, the 510(k) filing must be certified by the submitter
77
(not an external consultant).
There are strict and severe consequences of non-compliance
with such obligations to the FDA. The FDA has the power to take
enforcement actions that can include removal of the product from
market, seizure, and personal financial liability for company
78
officers. There can even be criminal liability imposed for fraud
upon the FDA. For example, fraud upon the FDA could expose
conspirators to federal prosecution for a federal conspiracy offense
79
under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
On the other hand, there are possible mitigating factors to an
allegation of breach of the duty of candor to the PTO.
Immateriality of information to the PTO, or its cumulative nature
with respect to other previously submitted information may help
80
mitigate the consequences of non-compliance.
Additional
mitigating factors may include: organizational structure, regulatory
group or 510(k) submitter separate from patent counsel, R&D
77. 21 C.F.R. § 807.93(a)(1) (2012) (“A 510(k) statement submitted as part
of a premarket notification shall state as follows: I certify that, in my capacity as
(the position held in company by person required to submit the premarket
notification, preferably the official correspondent in the firm), of (company name), I
will make available all information included in this premarket notification on
safety and effectiveness within 30 days of request by any person if the device
described in the premarket notification submission is determined to be
substantially equivalent. The information I agree to make available will be a
duplicate of the premarket notification submission, including any adverse safety and
effectiveness information, but excluding all patient identifiers, and trade secret and
confidential commercial information, as defined in 21 CFR [sic] 20.61.” (emphasis
added)).
78. See, e.g., Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565,
1578–79 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (illustrating an example of liability for officers).
79. For example, Micro Interventional Systems, Inc submitted 510(k) filings
that contained materially false and fraudulent documents. The director of
Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance was sentenced to 10 months in prison for
her role in submitting fraudulent 510(k) notifications. See Former Medical Company
Official Sentenced to 10 Months Charged with Fraud Against the United States,
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. (Sept. 4, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001
/September/445civ.htm.
80. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 762 (2009) (highlighting solutions to
the current inequitable conduct doctrine’s emphasis on over-compliance—
submitting of excess immaterial information).
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personnel working on patent application, size of organization, or
good faith.
VIII. THE BREADTH OF THE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION EXTENDS
BEYOND PRIOR ART
Case law illustrates scenarios in which information not
considered to be prior art may still constitute information material
to patentability. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., Rhone-Poulenc obtained a U.S. patent based on semi-synthesis
81
The U.S. matter claimed
of the chemotherapy drug Taxol.
priority to an earlier-filed French patent, and the French patent
82
itself was based on a draft submission for a scholarly journal. The
final journal article stated that the method of making Taxol could
only be successful by use of certain protecting groups, such as
methoxymethyl protecting group at C-2’, which could not be
83
removed following esterification and unique reaction conditions.
The journal article was not disclosed to the PTO, nor were the
84
technical limitations of the article discussed in the U.S. patent. In
fact, the U.S. patent seemed to suggest that the technical
85
limitations did not even exist. The journal article was held to be
material, even though it was not prior art since its publication date
86
was after the filing date of the patent. The journal article was still
deemed to be material because it concerned issues of enablement
87
and contradicted positions taken in the patent application.
With this as a guidepost, it may be worth considering sharing
pre-filing and post-filing information with a patent attorney for
review to evaluate such information for possible disclosure to the
PTO. Even if such post-filing information does not outright
contradict a position taken in the patent application, it still may be
worth considering for disclosure to inoculate the patent application
against contrived assertions along such lines. Such post-filing
information may arise from the FDA submissions, including from
the duty of candor to the FDA that may necessitate submitting
negative information or data to the FDA that contradicts the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

326 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1234–35.
Id. at 1234–38.
Id.
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earlier-filed patent. Similarly, while drafting a patent application, it
may be wise to be circumspect with respect to positions taken that
may potentially later be contradicted in data submitted to the FDA,
such as by data being gathered during preclinical or clinical studies
that are ongoing or in the future at the time the patent application
is filed.
Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd.,
88
is a representative guidepost case regarding candor to the PTO.
89
Bruno sued Acorn on its patented stairlift for the elderly. Acorn
produced numerous prior art stairlifts and, in defense, accused
Bruno of having intentionally withheld material prior art on the
90
“Wecolator” stairlift from the PTO.
Bruno had submitted
91
information on several prior art stairlifts to the FDA in its 510(k).
Bruno argued “that its claim of ‘substantial equivalence’ between”
its SRE-1500 and the Wecolator (which was not disclosed to the
PTO) “was relevant only for the purpose of securing FDA
92
approval.” Bruno also argued that despite its awareness of the
prior art stairlifts, it did not appreciate the Wecolator’s
93
materiality.
Bruno’s non-materiality arguments were unpersuasive in both
94
95
the district court and the Federal Circuit.
The patent
examination history suggested that had the examiner been made
aware of the Wecolator, Bruno’s amendments would have been
96
insufficient to achieve allowance.
Bruno’s argument of
unawareness of materiality was deemed “disingenuous” because
“the FDA submission was prepared by William Belson”—the same
individual “who was also involved in prosecution of” the Bruno
97
patent being asserted against Acorn.
Regarding intent, the

88. 394 F.3d 1348, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
89. Id. at 1350.
90. Id. at 1350.
91. Id. at 1350–51.
92. Id. at 1352.
93. Id. at 1351.
94. Id. at 1350–51 (citing Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility
Servs., Ltd., No. 02-C-0391-C, 2003 WL 23095743 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2003)).
95. Id. at 1355.
96. Id. at 1353. Incidentally, such a finding would meet the present “but-for”
materiality requirement established under Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
97. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 394 F.3d at 1352 (citing Black v. Cutter
Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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Federal Circuit found that “[w]hile the district court indeed
provided little explicit support for its finding of intent, it is well
established that, as an appellate tribunal, we review judgments, not
98
99
opinions.”
The review focused on the evidence of record.
Bruno failed to offer a “credible” explanation for the
100
nondisclosure.
Given that the same individual was involved in preparing the
FDA submission and the prosecution of the patent application in
Bruno, the question naturally arises: is there “plausible deniability”
in a large organization in which these different functions are
performed by different individuals? In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v.
Abbot Laboratories, the court briefly touched upon this very issue
with respect to “taste perversion” results that were disclosed to the
FDA, but not the PTO, stating,
Abbott’s argument appears to be that it is a very large
corporation with many employees performing disparate
tasks in separate facilities who cannot all be required to
know what each of the others is doing. In short, Abbott
appears to be arguing that because it has many employees
who do not all communicate with each other as well as
they might, this Court should find no more than
negligence on Abbott’s part in its failure to disclose the
material results of the clinical studies. . . . [H]owever, this
Court preliminarily finds that Abbott fails to provide a
credible explanation for the failure to disclose the taste
perversion results to the PTO. The results were highly
material, but Abbott selectively disclosed only the
gastrointestinal results despite claiming reduced taste
101
perversion . . . .
In Abbott, it was the same inventors named on the patent that
also approved and signed off on clinical study reports and authored
102
Thus, there may be risk in having a named
a journal article.
inventor on the patent also certify the 510(k) submission because
such a certification may impute knowledge of the regulatory
process to the inventor or, additionally or alternatively, may impute
the inventor’s knowledge of adverse or contradictory information
98. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 394 F.3d at 1354.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. No. 04-C-8079, 2005 WL 3050608, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2005)
(emphasis added).
102. Id.
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to those preparing regulatory filings.
Given these holdings, one might assume that FDA filings must
be scoured, and everything from the FDA file must be resubmitted
103
to the PTO. But consider Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.,
which reached a different result than Bruno. Bruno involved non104
disclosure of prior art. Pfizer involved data submitted to the FDA
105
No inequitable conduct was found
for seeking Lipitor approval.
106
This
in Pfizer for failure to submit similar data to the PTO.
finding was based on (1) a credible assertion that the data was
unreliable and thus immaterial and (2) that the submitter of the
107
data to the FDA was not the same as the inventor, Dr. Roth. With
this contrary result to Bruno in mind, the question is again raised: Is
there an unnecessary risk that is created in having a named
inventor on the patent also certify the 510(k) submission?
In another noteworthy example, Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz,
®
Inc. involved a drug-related patent involving Abbott’s Biaxin XL
108
antibiotic. Here, studies submitted to the FDA indicated a lack of
supporting evidence for the patent’s claimed method of reducing
109
gastrointestinal (GI) side effects.
The district court found,
however, that the information was “not material to patentability”
because various other tables of information demonstrating no
change in GI side effects had already been submitted (meaning
that the submission of the additional studies would have been
110
cumulative).
Viewing the preceding two cases in isolation, one may be lulled
into a false sense of security that no inequitable conduct will be
found for failure to cite data to the PTO that had been cited in the
FDA submissions. This is likely not a safe assumption. Pfizer and
Abbott both relied on specific factual considerations involving the
un-submitted data. In Pfizer, the data was deemed questionable. In
Abbott, the data was deemed cumulative. In sum, it may be best to
err on the side of caution and submit to the PTO any notably

103. 405 F. Supp. 2d 495, 523–24 (D. Del. 2005) (distinguishing Bruno Indep.
Living Aids, Inc., 394 F.3d 1328), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded by 457 F.3d
1284 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
104. Id. at 523.
105. Id. at 501.
106. Id. at 525.
107. Id. at 522–23.
108. 544 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 1357.
110. Id.
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different information submitted to the FDA or to be certain that an
objectively credible explanation exists for not submitting such
information.
IX. EXEMPTION FROM INFRINGEMENT UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1)
The interplay between FDA and patent law is also evident in
the limited exemption from patent infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1).
In 1984, a pharmaceutical company was sued for use of a
111
patented chemical in bioequivalence testing for a generic drug.
At trial, the company argued that the use did not constitute patent
112
infringement because it was experimental.
The Federal Circuit
found the use to constitute patent infringement and focused on
the purpose of the experiments, which was to prepare for
113
competition with the patented product after patent expiration. It
was widely recognized that this decision would effectively force
pharmaceutical companies to delay bioequivalence testing until
after expiration of a competitive patent. That, in turn, would delay
market launch of a generic drug until well after the patent
expiration, due to the time required to carry out such
bioequivalence testing, and would effectively provide a de jure
extension of the term of the patent.
In response, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and
114
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.
This included the 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provision, which established a safe harbor for an
experimental use related to a regulatory approval submission,
thereby addressing the issue of artificial extension of effective
patent life.
The statute states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological

111.
1984).
112.
113.
114.

Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 861–62.
Id. at 863.
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
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115

products.
This regulatory submission exemption from patent
infringement of § 271(e)(1) provides yet another example of the
interplay between the FDA regulatory process and patent law. It is
worth exploring several potential questions that it raises. First,
what is its applicability to medical devices? Second, how broad is
the language “solely for uses reasonably related”? Third, what are
the practical implications of the § 271(e)(1) exemption in business
strategy planning for a medical device?
116
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court
117
recognized that § 271(e)(1) applies to a “patented invention.”
The Court further concluded that “a patented invention” under
§ 271(e)(1) includes all inventions subject to FDA approval and not
118
simply drug-related inventions alone.
Therefore, the Court
decided that medical devices must be included in the research
119
The Federal Circuit later further
exemption under § 271(e)(1).
clarified this in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., finding that the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption applies to all medical devices regardless of
FDA classification and is not limited to the class III medical device
120
at issue in Eli Lilly.
After Eli Lilly and Abtox, the scope of the exemption, which is
121
“solely for uses reasonably related” to the FDA approval process,
122
was further clarified. In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., a district
court noted that the inquiry is not focused on whether the alleged
infringer has engaged in conduct that has purposes beyond
123
presenting data to the FDA.
Instead, one relying on the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption need only believe there was a “decent
prospect” that the use would contribute information relevant to an
124
FDA submission.
The activities at issue in Intermedics were the
manufacture of several hundred Cadence defibrillators, sales of
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
116. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
117. Id. at 665.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 667–69.
120. See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1028–30 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“Section 271(e)(1) makes no distinctions based upon the different FDA classes of
medical devices or drugs.”).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
122. 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
123. Id. at 1280.
124. Id.
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Cadence to hospitals in the United States, sales of Cadence to
international distributors, testing of Cadence (including certain
testing done in Germany), and demonstrations of Cadence at
125
“trade shows.”
The district court found that these commercial
activities, which were ancillary to testing needed for an FDA
regulatory submission, fell within the § 271(e)(1) exemption from
patent infringement, and the Federal Circuit affirmed in an
126
unpublished opinion.
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the Federal
Circuit applied the § 271(e)(1) exemption when the accused
infringer, Ventritex, demonstrated an infringing device at a
127
medical conference.
The Ventritex court found that
dissemination of data initially collected for the purposes of FDA
approval is not an act of infringement under § 271(e)(1), even
128
when the data is then used for collateral fundraising activities.
The court reasoned that an accused infringer should be permitted
to search for qualified investigators to conduct clinical trials and
129
that such use of data did not constitute a sale or an offer to sell.
130
Later, in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the United
States Supreme Court weighed in declaring that the § 271(e)(1)
safe harbor is applicable to “all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the . . . submission of any information under
131
the FDCA.”
The § 271(e)(1) exemption was found by the Merck
Court to include both clinical trials and preclinical studies
appropriate for FDA submission; however, consummating the FDA
regulatory submission is not required for the § 271(e)(1)
132
exemption to apply.
Although the Court gave a wide berth to
activities related to FDA submissions, the Court stated that the
exemption “does not globally embrace all experimental activity that
at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
125. Id. at 1282.
126. Id. at 1282–89. The court viewed this as dissemination of data developed
for FDA approval. Id. Because the data was initially gathered for FDA approval,
the exemption remained, despite use of the data for collateral fundraising
activities. Id.
127. See 982 F.2d 1520, 1524–25 (Fed. Cir. 1992), aff’g, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1960 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[Section 271(e)(1) is not] revoked when the resulting
data is later used for non-FDA reporting purposes.”).
128. Id. at 1525.
129. Id. at 1523.
130. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
131. Id. at 202.
132. Id. at 207–08.
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133

process.” Thus, the scope of the § 271(e)(1) exemption is not so
broad as to exempt from infringement basic scientific research
134
unrelated to an FDA regulatory approval submission.
To have
found otherwise would eviscerate any value on a patent directed
135
toward a research tool device or method.
This issue was squarely addressed in Proveris Scientific Corp. v.
Innovasystems, Inc., in which the defendant sold a patented optical
spray analyzer (OSA) only to pharmaceutical companies and the
FDA for use to measure parameters of aerosol sprays of nasal drug
136
delivery systems. The Proveris court noted that in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
137
Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that those products
listed in 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) were entitled to safe harbor under
138
§ 271(e)(1).
Therefore, the court ruled that the § 271(e)(1)
exemption did not apply since the OSA is not subject to a required
139
FDCA approval process under 35 U.S.C. § 156(f).
The court
stated that the patented invention itself must be subject to FDA
approval because Congress only intended to exempt those products
that are adversely affected by the unintended extension of patent
140
life caused by the FDA approval delay.
141
In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, the Federal
Circuit carved out post-approval activities from the § 271(e)(1)
exemption by holding that it “does not apply to information that
may be routinely reported to the FDA, long after marketing
142
approval has been obtained.”
The court cited legislative history
to emphasize that the purpose of § 271(e)(1) is simply to allow
generic manufacturers to experiment and prepare for regulatory
approval so as to be able to engage in commercial activity promptly
143
after patent expiration.
The court further stated that explicit
purpose of the exemption is to remedy the delay in market entry
due to the regulatory approval process suffered by would-be

133. Id. at 205 (quoting Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d
860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
134. Id. at 205–06.
135. Id. at 205 n.7.
136. 536 F.3d 1256, 1265–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
137. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
138. Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1262.
139. Id. at 1265.
140. Id.
141. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
142. Id. at 1070.
143. Id. at 1071.
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144

competitors.
The court also noted that previous cases had
exempted preclinical research whether eventually included in an
actual FDA submission or not, but explicitly declined to enlarge the
145
scope of the exemption to post-approval uses.
The bright-line rule of Classen was qualified somewhat by the
Federal Circuit in Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc.,
which held that post-ANDA approval activities fit within the scope
146
of § 271(e)(1). The Momenta court held that the plain language
of the statute was broad enough to cover any submission to the
147
FDA.
The court distinguished Classen on the grounds that the
information submitted in Momenta was not merely “routine” but
necessary for continued approval and ability to market the generic
148
drug.
The court pointed out that in Classen the information was
149
not required by the FDA.
Although these recent cases focused on pharmaceuticals, not
medical devices, the history of applying § 271(e)(1) jurisprudence
to medical devices may warrant using these cases as guidance for
analogous situations surrounding medical device regulatory
submissions to the FDA, at least to the extent that such activities are
necessary for continued approval and ability to market the medical
device. Nonetheless, since these questions have not been squarely
addressed in the context of medical devices, some risk may exist in
relying on such cases in the medical device context.
The § 271(e)(1) exemption raises a number of practical
considerations for a business strategy surrounding the design,
regulatory submission, and marketing of a medical device. First,
one should keep the issue of patent infringement and the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption from patent infringement in mind when
selecting a predicate device for use in a 510(k) submission. Ideally,
150
a patent Freedom-to-Operate (FTO) investigation
should be
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1071–72. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed in this case, with
the major issue being whether the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related” is by
definition limited to preapproval use of information required by FDA law or
whether the phrase refers to the type of use rather than to the time period during
which it was conducted. That petition was denied. GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013).
146. 686 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
147. Id. at 1358–59.
148. Id. at 1357–58.
149. Id. at 1368.
150. An FTO investigation can help ascertain whether a product or method
can be practiced without infringing potentially valid patent rights of another.
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carried out well in advance of clinical investigations, with
monitoring and updating occurring during the clinical
investigations and other activities leading up to an FDA approval
regulatory submission, such as a 510(k). This can help choose a
predicate device wisely, such as to avoid patent infringement, while
keeping the § 271(e)(1) exemption in mind.
Second, more specifically, one should be mindful that the
inappropriate choice of a predicate device relying on § 271(e)(1)
may inadvertently lock one into a position of patent infringement
of a patent covering the predicate device, unless that patent under
§ 271(e)(1) generally expires (at latest) upon FDA approval, with
Classen and Momenta leaving post-approval activities, at the very
least, extremely vulnerable to being excluded from the § 271(e)(1)
exemption. Simply put, if a patent at issue on a selected predicate
device has not expired, then upon FDA approval the approved
medical device may now be infringing that patent, since
§ 271(e)(1)’s safe-harbor provision no longer applies. Moreover,
the medical device maker may be unable to modify the medical
device without re-submitting the modified product to the FDA,
thereby effectively locking the medical device into a position of
patent infringement until expiration of the patent. Parties should
exercise care to avoid this outcome.
Third, if there is intent to rely on the § 271(e)(1) exemption
for preclinical, clinical, or other regulatory approval activities, it is
worth asking whether the clinical study can be designed (or
whether the clinical study protocol or 510(k) submission can be
written) in such a way as to document the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor.
This might include clearly stating that the study is being carried out
for the purpose of FDA regulatory submission, and that the FDA
regulatory touchstones of “safety” and “efficacy” are being
addressed by the clinical study, if in fact that is indeed the case.
Fourth, it is worth being at least somewhat wary of the
statements in the case law emphasizing the breadth of the safe
harbor of § 271(e)(1) as applicable to certain forms of arguably
commercial activity ancillary to regulatory-approval submission
activity. If the § 271(e)(1) exemption is being relied upon, then
personnel throughout the medical device manufacturer’s
organization should be cognizant of that fact and its limited nature.
In sum, with these considerations regarding the § 271(e)(1)
exemption in mind, coordination between regulatory and
intellectual property personnel is key in avoiding any problems.
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X. PATENT TERM EXTENSION FOR REGULATORY APPROVAL DELAY
The interplay between FDA and patent law is even more
directly evident in the availability of patent term extension for FDA
regulatory approval delay, which, as explained below, is extremely
limited since it is available only to products approved under the
151
PMA route, and not the 510(k) route, and is limited to extension
152
of the term of a single patent.
A patent gives the owner of the patent a right to exclude
others from practicing the claimed invention for a specified period
of time (referred to as the patent’s “term”). In the United States, a
153
patent’s term is generally twenty years from the earliest priority
154
Once a patent is granted, the patented product may still
date.
require FDA approval before the product can be marketed. The
time consumed in obtaining such approval decreases the time
available to the patentee to act as the exclusive provider of the
patented product. Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, a patent term can be
155
extended for PMA regulatory approval delay.
Section 156(a)
states that, “[t]he term of a patent which claims a product, a
method of using a product, or method of manufacturing a product
shall be extended . . . if . . . (4) the product has been subject to a
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or
156
use.”
In order to qualify for the § 156 patent term extension, an
application must be submitted by the patentee to the PTO. The
patent term extension application must be submitted within sixty
days of the date on which the product received FDA permission for
157
commercial use.
The § 156 patent term extension is available for
pharmaceuticals and for medical devices. Through April 4, 2012,
there have been 617 patents extended under § 156. Of the 617
151. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(3)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
152. Id. § 156(c)(4).
153. Id. § 154(a)(2).
154. A provisional application shall not be taken into account in determining
the term of a patent. Id. § 154(a)(3). Take note that patents filed before January
1, 1995 have a term of seventeen years from the patent grant. Patents that were in
force on June 8, 1995, or that issued on an application that was filed before June 8,
1995, have a term that is the greater of the twenty-year term or seventeen years
from the patent grant. Id. § 154(c)(1).
155. Id. § 156.
156. Id. § 156(a)(4) (2006).
157. Id. § 156(d)(1); MPEP, supra note 29, § 2754.
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patents that were extended, 570 were for pharmaceuticals and 47
158
This may reflect the higher value
were for medical devices.
placed on the latter part of the patent term in the pharmaceutical
industry than in the medical device industry. Alternatively, this
may simply indicate that FDA regulatory approval is more likely to
be sought via a new drug application, which is the equivalent of a
PMA for pharmaceuticals, than for medical devices, for which the
510(k) route is a more common path to FDA regulatory approval.
The application for a § 156 patent term extension generally
includes several parts. First, the application should include the
identity of the product and the relevant federal statute for
159
regulatory review. Second, the identity of the relevant patent and
160
Further,
the identity of each relevant claim should be included.
the applicant should include a statement showing how the claims of
the patent for which extension is sought map to the approved
161
product.
Third, the application should include information for
162
Fourth,
the PTO to determine eligibility for patent extension.
the dates and description of activities performed during the
163
regulatory review period should be included.
Fifth, any other
164
information the PTO may require should be included.
There are limitations placed on what can be extended and
how much time can be added with the extension. The length of an
extension depends on several factors. The length of extension is
set forth in § 156, and extensions for medical devices are
165
specifically set forth in § 156(g)(3).
There are three important
dates: (1) when clinical investigations on humans began; (2) when
the PMA application was initially submitted for the device; and (3)
166
when the PMA application was approved.
The length of the
extension equals half of the number of days between the date when
clinical investigations on humans began and the date when the
PMA application was initially submitted for the device, in addition
to the number of days between the date when the PMA application

158. Patent Term Extensions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:57
PM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1)(A).
160. Id. § 156(d)(1)(B).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 156(d)(1)(C).
163. Id. § 156(d)(1)(D).
164. Id. § 156(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 1.740 (2012); MPEP, supra note 29, § 2753.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 156.
166. Id. § 156(g)(3).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/5

28

Arora et al.: The Interplay between FDA and Patent Law: Infusing Organizational

1204

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

was initially submitted for the device and the date when the PMA
167
application was approved.
There are, however, some limitations to the length of the § 156
168
extension. The extension cannot be longer than five years.
Additionally, the patent’s expiration date (including the extension)
cannot be more than fourteen years from the date of regulatory
169
approval. Finally, and significantly, no more than one patent can
be extended for the same regulatory review period for any
170
product.
An applicant’s diligence can also affect the § 156 patent term
extension. “[E]ach period of the regulatory review period shall be
reduced by any period determined under subsection (d)(2)(B)
during which the applicant for the patent extension did not act
with due diligence during such period of the regulatory review
171
period.”
The diligence required for the extension is diligence
172
A third party can petition the
with the FDA, not with the PTO.
§ 156 patent term extension, by asserting applicant’s lack of
173
diligence.
Notably, a patent can be eligible for a patent term adjustment
(PTA) for PTO delay, in addition to an FDA delay extension under
174
§ 156. If a patent is eligible for both a PTA for PTO delay and an
extension under § 156 for FDA regulatory approval delay, the § 156
175
In sum, the PTO
extension extends from the date of the PTA.
and FDA delay extensions are additive, not concurrent.
176
A patent that has been terminally disclaimed is still eligible
177
178
A patentee can terminally disclaim a
for § 156 extension.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A).
169. Id. § 156(c)(3).
170. Id. § 156(c)(4).
171. Id. § 156(c)(1).
172. 21 C.F.R. § 60.36 (2012).
173. Id. § 60.30.
174. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
175. “A patent term extension generally extends the patent from its ‘original
expiration date,’ as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 154 to include extension under 35
U.S.C. § 154 (b).” MPEP, supra note 29, § 2758.
176. When a patentee has terminally disclaimed a portion of a second patent,
the second patent and the first patent will normally have the same expiration date.
See 35 U.S.C. § 253.
177. MPEP, supra note 29, § 2751.
178. Generally, when a patentee terminally disclaims a portion of a patent’s
term, such a disclaimer constrains the term of the patent so that it will expire at
the same time as an earlier-issued patent. 35 U.S.C. § 253.
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portion of a patent’s term if the patent is deemed obvious in view
179
of a different previously filed patent owned by the patentee. The
second patent is still eligible for an extension under § 156, even
180
though it was terminally disclaimed.
There are many things that should be considered when
applying for an extension under § 156. The possibility of a § 156
extension can be considered when deciding between which FDA
regulatory approval route to take: 510(k) or PMA. Although the
PMA route is likely lengthier and more onerous, it may be possible
to recover some of the delay in terms of § 156 patent term
extension, albeit only for a single patent. It seems unlikely,
however, that this would ever outweigh the additional delay to
market given the increased uncertainty of the PMA route, before
both the FDA and the PTO, since the § 156 patent term extension
benefit ultimately depends on what coverage can be obtained in a
single patent for which the § 156 extension can be sought.
For products that are undergoing PMA, it may be
advantageous to map patents to such products in order to get the
most value out of any patent that might be eligible for § 156
extension. Since only one patent can be extended under § 156, a
patentee would have to choose the “best” patent on which to apply
for the § 156 extension. The patentee will have to decide which
patent is “best,” which may be based on, among other things: actual
infringement,
patent
strength
(infringement,
validity,
enforceability), and the amount of extended term available.
Within a medical device company, regulatory personnel
responsible for the FDA approval should communicate the
appropriate docket deadline to the patent personnel, so there is no
question of diligence or missed deadlines. It should also be
remembered that a third party can challenge the diligence of the
patentee during the FDA regulatory approval investigation and
submissions, and the § 156 extension can be adjusted. In sum,
these decisions will require coordination between regulatory and
intellectual property personnel.

179. Id.
180. Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322–24 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). But, in contrast to patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156, patent
term adjustment under 35 U.S.C. § 154 cannot extend a patent’s term beyond the
term of the earlier-expiring patent if a terminal disclaimer has been filed. 35
U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B).
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XI. CONCLUSIONS
For medical devices, the patent and FDA regulatory processes
have considerable interplay.
Simply put, commercializing a
medical device is unlike developing other products. As explained
above, it can involve significant clinical research, a clinical trial to
demonstrate safety and effectiveness, and regulatory approval from
the FDA. How a company handles these tasks will impact its patent
portfolio. The people focused on these tasks are likely oblivious to
patent consequences—they are simply diligently working toward
other goals and have other business needs.
Medical device patent attorneys should beware: you may live
and breathe patents, but you likely lead a solitary existence. Most
people in your company are probably blissfully unaware of how
their everyday activities can impact your company’s patent
portfolio. You may never know the consequences of what they are
doing until uncovered much later during patent litigation, which is
common in the medical device industry. Infusing knowledge of the
interplay between the patent and FDA processes can help ensure
coordination between regulatory and intellectual property
personnel, increase opportunities, and avoid pitfalls with the patent
portfolio and accompanying business strategy.
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